In this paper, we show how the conflict between the shareholders (owners) and managers of firms in terms of profit rates generates dynamics between growth and distribution that results in a long-run variation in the capacity utilization rate. The model developed here generates oscillations in...

In this paper, we show how the conflict between the shareholders (owners) and managers of firms in terms of profit rates generates dynamics between growth and distribution that results in a long-run variation in the capacity utilization rate. The model developed here generates oscillations in...

Continuously rebalanced long-short trades are similar to highly levered trades in that their PNL profile depends not only on the final distribution of return, but also on the realized co-variance structure of the asset pair. It's easily possible for both orientations of a rebalanced long-short...

We consider forecast guidance as a mechanism that managers use to avoid negative earnings surprises. Modeling forecast guidance using methods by Matsumoto, [Accounting Review 77 (3) (2002) 483-514] and Bartov et al. [Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (2) (2002) 173-204], we show that...

If managers are risk-averse and compensation schemes are not directly linked to shareholder wealth, incentives to allocate effort to manage effects of relative and macroeconomic shocks may be distorted. In this paper we develop a simple model to identify factors that determine the optimal...

Macroeconomic fluctuations such as interest rate and exchange rate can be considered sources of good or bad “luck” for corporate performance. Incentive effects of performance-based compensation for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences depending on the ability of...

Whether a manager leads the innovation efforts of a firm in line with shareholder preferences has a substantial impact on the firm's market value and growth. This in turn influences aggregate productivity growth and welfare. Using data on US public firms, we find that (i) firms with better...

Malawian Banking Industry is characterised by supra normal profits and excessively high executive compensation. This is against the backdrop of negative growth rate of Gross Domestic Product in Malawi indicating that several sectors are struggling to cope up with the global financial meltdown of...

This chapter assesses the behavior of corporate managers and boards of directors within the framework of agency theory, stewardship theory, and psychological biases. In agency theory, a chief executive officer (CEO) is motivated to act in his or her own best interests rather than those of...

We examine the financial and real implications of bank CEOs’ social minds induced by female socialization. We find evidence of an economically sizable and statistically significant bank CEO-daughter effect in lending behaviours, controlling for borrower industry as well as bank...