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Privately held or publicly owned? : large shareholders and corporate control
Toukan, Amjad - In: Theoretical economics letters 4 (2014) 6, pp. 397-409
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530817
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Change of company ownership, CEO turnover and the origin of CEO : case from Indonesia
Lindrianasari; Hartono, Jogiyanto; Supriyadi; Miharjo, … - In: Journal for global business advancement : JGBA 6 (2013) 1, pp. 3-12
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009762771
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When do non-family CEOs outperform in family firms? : agency and behavioural agency perspectives
Miller, Danny; Le Breton-Miller, Isabelle; Minichilli, … - In: Journal of management studies : JMS 51 (2014) 4, pp. 547-572
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380698
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The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium
Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345872
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Corporate ownership structure and top executives' prosocial preferences : the role of relational and external blockholders
Zeitoun, Hossam; Pamini, Paolo - In: Corporate governance : an international review 23 (2015) 6, pp. 489-503
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011528930
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Effects of internal governance factors on cross-border-related party transactions of Chinese companies
Hu, Song-hua; Li, Guang; Xu, Yue-hua; Fan, Xu-ang - In: Emerging markets finance & trade : a journal of the … 48 (2012), pp. 58-73
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009682662
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Do independent directors matter? : evidence from regulatory change in an emerging market
Huang, Hsu-Huei - In: Emerging markets, finance & trade : a journal of the … 58 (2022) 4, pp. 1137-1146
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013167072
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The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
Chaigneau, Pierre - 2017
We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975704
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Performance sensitivity of executive pay : the role of ownership structure, board leadership structure and board characteristics
Ataay, Aylin - In: Economic research 31 (2018) 1,2, pp. 1152-1168
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012391393