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We document a stylized fact that more than 10% of S&P 1500 companies have hired a CEO who starts the job near or above the retirement age of 65 years old (Retiring CEOs). This phenomenon exists among all industries and persists over time. This finding is puzzling because conventional wisdom...
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Many observers consider the most important responsibility of the board of directors its responsibility to hire and fire the CEO. To this end, an interesting situation arises when a CEO resigns and the board chooses neither an internal nor external candidate, but a current board member as...
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We propose a model in which firms use corporate governance as part of an optimal compensation scheme: better governance incentivizes managers to perform better and thus saves on the cost of providing pay for performance. However, when managerial talent is scarce, firms compete to attract better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128452
We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and for insurance of low-quality managers. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085052
We construct a new index of CEO general managerial skill using the industry composition of the CEO compensation peer group and use it to examine the relation between CEO general skill and CEO pay. Our index has the advantage of capturing the board's perception of CEO general skill and is less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901239
We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940502
We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008378