Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously-awarded incentive compensation from managers involved in accounting manipulation or misconduct. I study theoretically and empirically the impact of clawback provisions on the horizon of executive pay when shareholders face clawback...

Following Oyer (2004) and Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006), we provide evidence that the level of stock option compensation results from outside opportunities in the managerial labor market for a sample of 3,214 CEO-year observations from S&P1500 companies between 1996 and 2010. We argue that...

Many observers consider the most important responsibility of the board of directors its responsibility to hire and fire the CEO. To this end, an interesting situation arises when a CEO resigns and the board chooses neither an internal nor external candidate, but a current board member as...

Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...

Our paper evaluates recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent setting, in which the agent exerts effort for an immediately observable task (acquisition) and a task for which...

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is, at least on paper, enjoying widespread popularity in determining the level of executive compensation. Yet existing empirical evidence of RPE is decidedly mixed. Two principal explanations are held responsible for this discord. A constructional challenge...

We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...

This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the one hand, financial vehicles can offer...

Given the recent empirical evidence on peer effects in CEO compensation, this paper theoretically examines how relative wealth concerns, in which a manager's satisfaction with his own compensation depends on the compensation of other managers, affect the equilibrium contracting strategy and...

Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...