While recent studies show that long vesting periods in managerial compensation increase corporate investments, it may reshape the shareholder-debtholder conflict as shareholders have to split the gains with creditors. We find that firms with longer CEO pay durations use more short-maturity...

This paper studies the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on managerial compensation horizon under common ownership. We find that the predominant governance approach under common ownership is the threat of exit, which inadvertently exacerbates managerial myopia. Hence, common owners tend...

This paper finds that CEO incentive horizons, proxied by their executives’ pay duration, are positively associated with their firms’ engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR), especially when those firms face high risk of reputation loss, need stakeholder support, or maintain...

We examine the impact of optimistic directors that are members of boards and compensation committees on CEOs compensation. We find that optimistic boards and compensation committees reward CEOs with a higher proportion of equity-based compensation. We utilize two natural experiments,...