Agency theory suggests that CEOs view dividends unfavorably because dividend payouts deprive them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to measure CEO power, we find that an increase in CEO power by one standard...

We explore the role of powerful CEOs on the extent of risk-taking, using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS). Based on more than 12,000 observations over 20 years (1992-2012), our results reveal a non-monotonic association. In particular, relatively less powerful CEOs...

Motivated by agency theory, we explore how powerful CEOs view leverage. Due to the agency conflict, CEOs may adopt sub-optimal leverage levels that promote their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to gauge CEO...

Motivated by agency theory, this study attempts to ascertain whether chief executive compensation is influenced by legal rules. In particular, we analyze whether Delaware law has an impact on CEO pay. Legal rules have been argued to impact agency conflicts. Agency costs, in turn, affect CEO...