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We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045865
We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094032
We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler (1995). We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046017
We consider an example of a Markov game with lack of information on one side, that was first introduced by Renault (2002). We compute both the value and optimal strategies for a range of parameter values.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780837
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204396
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost — the more lucrative is the agent's stream of future rents following a failure,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084929
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal cannot commit to future actions. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111103
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344507
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003873500
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011556859