We study a novel trade-off in market transparency regulation by estimating a structural model of the German retail gasoline market. Transparent environments enable easy price comparisons and match findings. Restricting transparency such that only the cheapest offers are shown induces firms to...

This paper presents a theoretical model of competition between information intermediaries applied to credit rating industry. Sellers rely on intermediaries to credibly communicate their quality to buyers. Intermediaries are strategic and compete in fees as well as their certification standards...

Competition on the German gasoline market is of interest for economists, competition authorities and the general public alike. In this paper, I analyse how constantly lower gasoline prices in Poland affect the prices set in the German border region. More precisely, I estimate the impact of one...

We analyze the effects of accidents and liability obligations on the incentives of car manufacturers to monopolize the markets for their spare parts. We show that monopolized markets for spare parts lead to higher overall expenditures for consumers. Furthermore, while the manufacturers invest...

This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction. Demand by the auctioneer is uncertain as in the supply function equilibrium model. A closed form expression is derived. Existence of an equilibrium is ensured if the hazard rate...

In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the pure-strategy, Nash...

It has been argued that having a contract market before the spot market enhances competition (Allaz and Vila, 1993). Taking into account the repeated nature of electricity markets, we check the robustness of the argument that the access to contract markets reduces the market power of generators....

An important discussion in recent years is the introduction of product patentsand the abolition of process patents. In a model with endogenous number of innovatingfirms, we show that whether product patent increases R&D is ambiguous, and depends onthe type of market demand and the cost of R&D....

We show that a monopolist input supplier licenses its technology to create a second source of input supply if second sourcing increases competition in the final goods market. We also show that welfare increases under second sourcing...

In a vertically separated industry, where the input suppliers have significantmarket power, not only entry but also the markets (upstream or downstream) withentry possibilities might be a concern to the policy makers. While ‘entry in thedownstream market only’ always increases welfare,...