This paper evaluates how different lengths of entry regulation impact market structure and market performance using a dynamic structural model. We formulate an oligopoly model in the tradition of Ericson and Pakes (1995) and allow entry costs to vary over time. Firms have the opportunity to...

This study evaluates how different lengths of entry protection impact consumer and producer surplus. We formulate a dynamic oligopoly model in the tradition of Ericson and Pakes (1995) and allow entry costs to vary over time. Firms choose the optimal time to enter a market, and make output and...

This paper evaluates how different lengths of entry regulation impact market structure and market performance using a dynamic structural model. We formulate an oligopoly model in the tradition of Ericson and Pakes (1995) and allow entry costs to vary over time. Firms have the opportunity to...

We focus on the estimation of market entry costs that are declining over time and evaluate their impact on competition and market performance. We employ a dynamic oligopoly model in which firms make entry, exit, and production decisions in the presence of declining entry costs and learning by...

We focus on the estimation of market entry costs that are declining over time and evaluate their impact on competition and market performance. We employ a dynamic oligopoly model in which firms make entry, exit, and production decisions in the presence of declining entry costs and learning by...

The U.S. and EU Merger Guidelines strongly emphasize the relevance of the "ease of entry" argument in merger evaluations. Up to now, very little is known empirically about how mergers affect entry and exit, and the resulting number of firms in the markets. We empirically test this aspect of...