Economic analysis of competition regulation is most developed in the domain of horizontal mergers, and modern agency guidelines reflect a substantial consensus on the appropriate template for merger assessment. Nevertheless, official protocols are understood to rest on a problematic market...

I analyze cliff discounts when an incumbent monopolist faces competition from a competitor that can compete for a portion (but not all) of the market, and compare them with both simple pricing and pricing formulas in which the incumbent can cut prices just in the competitive portion of the...

This paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are...

We analyze mergers and entry in a differentiated products oligopoly model of price competition. Any merger that does not yield efficiencies is unprofitable if it induces entry sufficient to preserve pre-merger consumer surplus. Thus, mergers occur in equilibrium only if barriers limit entry....

We propose a methodology for estimating the competition effects from entry when firms sell differentiated products. We first derive precise conditions under which Bresnahan and Reiss' entry threshold ratios (ETRs) can be used to test for the presence and to measure the magnitude of competition...

To foster competition the French government authorized a fourth operator, lsquo;Free', to enter the country's mobile phone market at the end of 2009 alongside Orange, SFR and Bouygues Telecom (BT), who held respectively one-half, one-third and one-sixth of the market. By using a stylized model...

We study the effects of merger on firm entry, product variety and prices in the retail craft beer market in California. We develop a new method to estimate multiple-discrete choice models in order to recover fixed costs. The method is based on bounds of conditional choice probabilities and does...

Consider a setting where threatened rather than actual import competition restrains a domestic oligopoly's prices. I show that not modeling the entry threat may underestimate the true degree of market power, as incumbents' blunted price responses to demand shocks resemble perfectly-competitive...