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Imperfect collusion on surveilled markets with free entry

Auer, Ludwig von; Tu Anh Pham - 2023

exits. By contrast, existing oligopoly models of collusive behavior consider only some of the four listed stylized facts and … group of firms competes against independent fringe rivals. The market is surveilled by an antitrust authority that has three …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014312372

Free entry in a Cournot market with overlapping ownership

Vives, Xavier; Vravosinos, Orestis - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636171

Mergers, innovation, and entry-exit dynamics : consolidation of the hard disk drive industry : 1996-2016

Igami, Mitsuru; Uetake, Kosuke - In: The review of economic studies : RES 87 (2020) 6, pp. 2672-2702

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012387349

On the Anticompetitive Effect of Exclusive Dealing when Entry by Merger is Possible

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Persson, Lars - 2007

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing, which assumes that entry can occur only by installing new capacity, by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320025

Internal versus external growth in industries with scale economies : a computational model of optimal merger policy

Mermelstein, Ben; Nocke, Volker; Satterthwaite, Mark Allen - 2014

computationally, allows firms to invest or propose mergers according to the relative profitability of these strategies. An antitrust … authority is able to block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy when the antitrust authority can commit to a … antitrust authority. We find that optimal policy can differ substantially from what would be best considering only welfare in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490479