Larger firms (by sales or employment) have higher leverage. This pattern is explained using a model in which firms produce multiple varieties and borrow with the option to default against their future cash ow. A variety can die with a constant probability, implying that bigger firms (those with...

Larger firms (by sales or employment) have higher leverage. This pattern is explained using a model in which firms produce multiple varieties, acquire new varieties from their inventors, and borrow against the future cash flow of the firm with the option to default. A variety can die with a...

Larger firms (by sales or employment) have higher leverage. This pattern is explained using a model in which firms produce multiple varieties and borrow with the option to default against their future cash flow. A variety can die with a constant probability, implying that bigger firms (those...

We study the stochastic behavior of a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition. Each seller sells his product in the consumption goods as well as the investment goods market and has market power in both. Consumers derive utility from a CES aggregate of all the consumption...