In a preemption game, players decide when to take an irreversible action. Delaying the action exogenously increases payoffs, but there is an early mover advantage. Riordan (1992) shows that in a preemption game with two asymmetric players, players act in decreasing order of efficiency. This...

I develop a dynamic investment game with a "memoryless" R&D process in which an incumbent and an entrant can invest in a new technology, and the entrant can also invest in the old technology. I show that an increase in the probability of successfully implementing a technology can cause the...

This paper analyzes time-consistent subsidies in industries with strong learning effects and frequent entry and exit. Structural dynamics create opportunities for strategic behavior: by influencing government policies, infant firms can reduce their tax burden and weaken future competitors. Two...

This study investigates the impact of the timing of manufacturers' market entry to an online market on the performances of all the firms in a supply chain. It considers a multi-echelon supply chain which consists of two manufacturers, who sell differentiated products and compete with each other,...

This paper develops a simple model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. It features toughness of competition, sunk entry costs, and market-level demand and cost shocks, but assumes that firms' expected payoffs are identical when entry and survival decisions are made. We...

In a hub-and-spoke network, the profit function of an airline is supermodular with respect to the airline's own entry decisions for different city-pairs. This source of complementarity implies that a hub-and-spoke network can be an effective strategy for deterring the entry of competitors. This...

Retailers may face uncertainty about the profitability of local markets, which provide opportunities for learning when making entry decisions. To quantify these informational benefits, I develop an empirical framework for studying dynamic retail entry with uncertainty and learning (from others)....

This paper examines a dynamic incumbent-entrant framework with stochastic evolution of the (inverse) demand, in which both the optimal timing of the investments and the capacity choices are explicitly considered. We find that the incumbent invests earlier than the entrant and that entry...

We investigate the decision of entry timing and product positions under market size uncertainty with Brownian motion for continuous-time spatial duopoly competition. We show the following results. First, the leader is more likely to increase the degree of product differentiation as volatility...

This paper develops an econometric model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. The model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, which can be computed very quickly. We show that its primitives are identified from market-level data on the number of...