In many telecommunications markets incumbent providers enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant. However, market entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage over the incumbent, since they are more efficient or operate on innovative technologies. Considering both a supply-side and a...

This paper analyzes empirically whether and if so to what extent later entrants in the European mobile telephony industry have a disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbents and early mover entrants. To analyze this question a dynamic model of market share development and a series of static models are...

We investigate the incentives for facility-based firms to invest in infrastructure upgrades and to foreclose service-based firms. We focus on asymmetric regulation regarding servicebased firms' access to the infrastructure held by a facility-based firm. Spillovers from the infrastructure...

This paper finds that a regulation that promotes competition in one market may decrease competition in other related markets. Policy makers in the telecommunication industry currently are facing an important decision about whether to continue unbundling regulations on new optical-fiber lines. I...

This paper analyzes how competition works in mobile telecommuncations markets and, bases on this analysis, we discuss whether regulatory intervention in mobile telephone markets is justified from an economic perspective. Starting point of our analysis is the observation that an evaluation of...

A mandatory open-network-provision (ONP) by dominant firms is the appropriate government regulation in the presence of network externalities. For basic telephone services and online services, a permanent ONP regulation seems indispensable, whereas telecommunication networks only require...

We explore the existence of first mover advantages in mobile telecommunications markets. Building on a data set comprising monthly penetration rates, market concentration, number of active operators, and market shares of 90 followers from 33 OECD countries, we estimate a dynamic growth model....

This paper models competition between two firms, which provide broadband Internet access in regional markets with different population densities. The firms, an incumbent and an entrant, differ in two ways. First, consumers bear costs when switching to the entrant. Second, the entrant faces a...

This paper models competition between two firms, which provide broadband Internet access in regional markets with different population densities. The firms, an incumbent and an entrant, differ in two ways. First, consumers bear costs when switching to the entrant. Second, the entrant faces a...

This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a...