We review the Economics literature on newspapers and magazines. Our emphasis is on the newspaper industry, especially in the United States, given that this has been the focus of existing research. We first discuss the structure of print media markets, describing the rise in the number of daily...

Over the past decade, an increasing number of firms have delegated pricing decisions to algorithms in consumer markets such as travel, entertainment, and retail; business markets such as digital advertising; and platform markets such as ride-sharing. This trend, driven primarily by the increased...

This paper analyses the quality provision of interrelated market firms under different market structures both theoretically and empirically. A theoretical model is built, where a media firm offers newspapers in a primary market and advertising space in the secondary market. Furthermore, the...

Actors on print media markets face two different (and interrelated) demand curves: the demand for copies and the demand for advertising space. This paper develops a realistic, yet simple, model of print media industries. In contrast to earlier studies, it takes into account that print media...

We extend the models in ("Competition in two-sided markets" of Armstrong (2006, Rand Journal of Economics) by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite price...

Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, and calls for regulation of the sector, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit...

We extend the models in ("Competition in Two-sided Markets" of Armstrong (2006, 'Rand Journal of Economics') by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite...