. Comparing the predicted and observed matching patterns, we find that the Gale-Shapley model explains the matches achieved by the … explore whether the estimated mate preferences, in conjunction with the Gale-Shapley algorithm, can explain the matching …

We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is also well …

It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a … new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will nd a … stable matching with high probability. In particular we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate …

We investigate the role of marital patterns in explaining rising income inequality using a structural marriage matching …

In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the … probability of the marital dissolution does not reduce divorce costs under gender-optimal matching rules. In such environments, an …

We extend the search-matching model of the marriage market of Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply and … estimated matching probabilities that can be derived from the steady-state flow conditions are strongly increasing in male and …

stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show …