. Comparing the predicted and observed matching patterns, we find that the Gale-Shapley model explains the matches achieved by the … explore whether the estimated mate preferences, in conjunction with the Gale-Shapley algorithm, can explain the matching …

It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a … new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will nd a … stable matching with high probability. In particular we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate …

We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary …

We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most generalsetting …

In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered … preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of … definitions for a stable matching: weak, strong and super-stability. Besides this, acceptable pairs in the instance can be …

stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show …We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption … patterns. We start by defining a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is …

. Stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We characterize stable marriage …We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption …. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable …