In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in...

This paper combines partner matching with an intra-household allocation model where couples decide if they want to marry or cohabitate. Marriage encourages but does not ensure a higher level of spousal commitment, which in turn can generate a larger marital surplus. Individuals' marital...

This paper examines how educational decisions affect job and marital satisfaction. We build up a model with educational assortative matching where individuals decide whether to attend university both for obtaining job satisfaction and for increasing the probability to be matched with an educated...

Consider a marriage market with continuous-time two-sided search and transferable utility in which the match payoff depends on age. This paper characterizes a set of payoff functions consistent with two salient marriage age patterns: (1) assortative matching by age, and (2) \differential age...

Abstract. If women marry younger than men, increased population growth causes a surplus of women in the marriage market. This paper introduces search frictions into a matching model with transferable utility and age-dependent match payoffs to study if this so-called marriage squeeze has caused a...

We model the bargaining process of parents over custody at the time of divorce. First we assume an institutional setting where only sole custody is available. In a second step we reform this institutional setting and introduce the possibility of joint custody. We show that some parents, who...

In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of changes in divorce costs on marital dissolution. Each individual who has a nontransferable expected utility about the quality of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or...

We extend the search-matching model of the marriage market of Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply and home production. We characterize the steadystate equilibrium when exogenous divorce is the only source of risk. We study nonparametric identification using cross-section data on...

Neither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect credit market. In the presence of credit rationing, efficiency and utility equalization are guaranteed only by a legally enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may...