We extend the analysis of van Damme (1987, Section 7.5) of the famous smoothing demand in Nash (1953) as an argument for the singular stability of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution among all Pareto efficient equilibria of the Nash demand game. Van Damme's analysis provides a clean...

We extend the analysis of van Damme (1987, Section 7.5) of the famous smoothing demand in Nash (1953) as an argument for the singular stability of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution among all Pareto efficient equilibria of the Nash demand game. Van Damme's analysis provides a clean...

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...

In this article we combine Debreu's (1952) social system with Hurwicz's (1994, 2008) ideas of embedding a "desired" game form into a "natural" game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is "illegal" according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend...

In this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if...