We consider the one-to-one two-sided matching with contracts model in which buyers face financial constraints. In this model there is a stable outcome, but not necessarily a competitive equilibrium as defined in the standard way. We propose a new equilibrium notion, quantity-constrained...

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive...

This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where agents have multiple attributes and general payoff functions. The model can be applied to several substantive issues. Here we use it to provide a novel understanding of the separate effects of equal opportunities for women in...

This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where agents have multiple attributes and general payoff functions. The model can be applied to several substantive issues. Here we use it to provide a novel understanding of the separate effects of equal opportunities for women in...

This paper develops a tractable extension of a Mortensen-Pissarides style matching model that allows for risk averse workers with limited ability to smooth consumption. I show that this leads to a form of equilibrium wage rigidity, as the inability of workers to smooth their consumption across...

We consider a matching with contracts model in the presence of liquidity constraints on the buyers side. Liquidity constraints can be either soft or hard. A convergent sequence of economies with increasingly stringent soft liquidity constraints is an economy with hard liquidity constraints at...

We compare the performance of markets and tournaments as allocative mechanisms in an economy with borrowing constraints. The model consists of a continuum of individuals who differ in their initial wealth and ability level (e.g. students) and that are to be assigned to a continuum of investment...

Various forms of efficiency exist in the context of two-sided matching. Following Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), an assignment is called ex-post efficient if no other deterministic assignment is improving on it; and ex-ante efficient if no lottery over deterministic assignments is. In the...

We introduce a simple model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically, and the composition of the trade network depends endogenously on the matching algorithm. Varying the timing properties of matching algorithms can substantially affect their...

The problem of demand inversion -- a crucial step in the estimation of randomutility discrete-choice models -- is equivalent to the determination of stable outcomes intwo-sided matching models. This equivalence applies to random utility models that are notnecessarily additive, smooth, nor even...