This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where agents have multiple attributes and general payoff functions. The model can be applied to several substantive issues. Here we use it to provide a novel understanding of the separate effects of equal opportunities for women in...

Various forms of efficiency exist in the context of two-sided matching. Following Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), an assignment is called ex-post efficient if no other deterministic assignment is improving on it; and ex-ante efficient if no lottery over deterministic assignments is. In the...

We introduce a simple model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically, and the composition of the trade network depends endogenously on the matching algorithm. Varying the timing properties of matching algorithms can substantially affect their...

The problem of demand inversion -- a crucial step in the estimation of randomutility discrete-choice models -- is equivalent to the determination of stable outcomes intwo-sided matching models. This equivalence applies to random utility models that are notnecessarily additive, smooth, nor even...

This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where agents have multiple attributes and general payoff functions. The model can be applied to several substantive issues. Here we use it to provide a novel understanding of the separate effects of equal opportunities for women in...

Concern over the distributional effects of policies which induce changes in peer group structure, or associational redistributions (Durlauf, 1996c), motivates a substantial body of theoretical and empirical research in economics, sociology, psychology, and education. A growing collection of...

The large markets model with a continuum of agents has been a major methodological innovation for studying real-life assignment problems. In this paper I study the following question: if we sample random finite economies from a continuum economy, will the Deferred Acceptance (DA) assignment of...

We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other...

This paper studies a decentralised job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other...

We prove existence of steady-state equilibrium in a class of matching models with search frictions.