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When do Systematic Gains Uniquely Determine the Number of Marriages between Different Types in the Choo-Siow matching model? Sufficient Conditions for a Unique Equilibrium

Decker, Colin - 2010

work is the issue of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We resolve this question in the affirmative, assuming the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009455387

Buyer’s equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility: A recursive approach

Camera, Gabriele; Kim, Jaehong - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 2, pp. 321-323

-off between price and trade probability. We present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in Nash equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608098

Steady states in matching and bargaining

Manea, Mihai - In: Journal of economic theory 167 (2017), pp. 206-228

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011741382

When do stable roommate matchings exist? : a review

Gudmundsson, Jens - In: Review of economic design : RED 18 (2014) 2, pp. 151-161

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365495

Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts : a topological approach

Fisher, James C. D. - In: Journal of mathematical economics 91 (2020), pp. 136-140

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012801335

Matching and Sorting with Horizontal Heterogeneity

Clark, Simon - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2004

This paper examine a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched with a similar partner; in short, “like attracts like”. Although such preferences imply a unique stable matching, the degree of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369070

Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like

Clark, Simon - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2007

This paper examines a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched to a similar partner, i.e. "like attracts like". such preferences imply a unique equilibrium assignment describing the pattern of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369085

Interpolating between matching and hedonic pricing models

Pass, Brendan - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 67 (2019) 2, pp. 393-419

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012040586

On stable and strategy-rooproof rules in matching markets with contracts

Hirata, Daisuke; Kasuya, Yusuke - 2015 - This version: September 25, 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549863

On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts

Hirata, Daisuke; Kasuya, Yusuke - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590652