Similar Search Results

On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games

Atay, Ata; Solymosi, Tamás - 2018

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011071

Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation

Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Dimitrov, Dinko - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 159-167

the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751376

Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R. - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-16

are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite … time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256

Lloyd Shapley's matching and game theory

Serrano, Roberto - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 115 (2013) 3, pp. 599-618

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009778348

A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets

Echenique, Federico; Oviedo, Jorge - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 2, pp. 233-273

-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703024

Substitution, complementarity, and stability

Stuart, Harborne W. - In: International game theory review 21 (2019) 1, pp. 1-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138693

Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Mauleon, Ana (contributor); … - 2008

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...