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A simple mechanism for the roommate problem

Evci, Bora - 2014

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem …". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the … implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716017

Marriage Formation With Assortative Meeting as a Two-Sided Optimal Stopping Problem

Parilina, Elena - 2013

In this paper, we study marriage formation through a two-sided secretary problem approach. We consider individuals with … characteristics. We show that individuals with a higher universal characteristic tend to be more picky in their marriage hunting. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081052

Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market

Bester, Helmut - 2021

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476

Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market

Bester, Helmut - 2021

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091

School Choice : Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms

Jaramillo, Paula - 2017

implement the set of stable (i.e., fair) matchings (Theorem 1). We show that our characterization also holds for "sub-implementation …" and "sup-implementation" (Corollaries 3 and 4). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955586

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; Heller, Christian-Philipp - 2016

We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711

Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets

Echenique, Federico; Pereyra, Juan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 1-39

We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673087

Pairing games and markets

Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435

The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

Sotomayor, Marilda - 2008

structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these … the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational … of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284048

A Simple Mechanism for the Roommate Problem

Evci, Bora - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141000