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Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem …". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the … implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716017
In this paper, we study marriage formation through a two-sided secretary problem approach. We consider individuals with … characteristics. We show that individuals with a higher universal characteristic tend to be more picky in their marriage hunting. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081052
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
implement the set of stable (i.e., fair) matchings (Theorem 1). We show that our characterization also holds for "sub-implementation …" and "sup-implementation" (Corollaries 3 and 4). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955586
We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673087
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these … the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational … of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284048
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem …". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the … implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141000