Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem …". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the … implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …

structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these … the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational … of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are …

. Comparing the predicted and observed matching patterns, we find that the Gale-Shapley model explains the matches achieved by the … explore whether the estimated mate preferences, in conjunction with the Gale-Shapley algorithm, can explain the matching …

It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a … new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will nd a … stable matching with high probability. In particular we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate …

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching … correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable. -- Matching with couples …

implement the set of stable (i.e., fair) matchings (Theorem 1). We show that our characterization also holds for "sub-implementation …" and "sup-implementation" (Corollaries 3 and 4). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete …

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching …