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Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011628386

Non-revelation mechanisms for manyto-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590504

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011486876

Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - In: Economics letters 144 (2016), pp. 98-101

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011617215

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Heller, Christian-Philipp - In: Applications of mechanism design, (pp. 89-105). 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011806843

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; Heller, Christian-Philipp - In: Social choice and welfare 48 (2017) 3, pp. 545-572

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011885657

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Bó, Inácio; Heller, C.-Philipp - 2016

We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711

Matched charitable contributions : comparative statics and equilibrium

Biederman, Daniel K. - In: Theoretical economics letters 3 (2013) 5, pp. 283-287

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243093

Decentralized college admissions under single application

Bonkoungou, Somouaoga - In: Review of economic design 25 (2021) 1/2, pp. 65-91

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012586229

Quantile stable mechanisms

Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. … - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-9

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms - quantile stable mechanisms - that generate stable matchings that can … the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these … mechanisms by market participants. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547697

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