This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power...

We embed a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility, a marriage market, into a random search model. We study steadystate equilibria and characterize the limit of the corresponding equilibrium matchings as exogenous search frictions become small. The central question is whether the...

We prove existence of steady-state equilibrium in a class of matching models with search frictions.

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power...

We embed a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility, a marriage market, into a random search model. We study steadystate equilibria and characterize the limit of the corresponding equilibrium matchings as exogenous search frictions become small. The central question is whether the...