We study how to reduce congestion in two-sided matching markets with private preferences. We measure congestion by the number of bits of information that agents must (i) learn about their own preferences, and (ii) communicate with others before obtaining their final match. Previous results by...

It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will nd a stable matching with high probability. In particular we...

We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of ‘offers’ based on estimated best alternative matches, in the spirit of pairwise Nash...

In a large online market, buyers were given the opportunity to signal their relative preferences over price and quality—first experimentally, then later as the default experience in the market. The possibility of signaling caused substantial sorting by sellers to buyers of the right...

In a labor market model with cheap talk, employers can send messages about their willingness to pay for higher-ability workers, which job-seekers can use to direct their search and tailor their wage bid. Introducing such messages leads—under certain conditions—to an informative separating...