We model a market, such as an online software market, in which an intermediary connects sellers and buyers by displaying sellers' products. With two vertically-differentiated products, an intermediary can place either: (1) one product, not necessarily the better one, on the first page, and the...

This paper addresses the location problem for an entering firm that will play a Bertrand game with other pre-existing firms in order to maximize its profit. Demand for a homogeneous product is price-sensitive and firms use delivered pricing. Under some specific conditions, it is shown that the...

Markets for natural resources and commodities are often oligopolistic. In these markets, production capacities are key for strategic interaction between the oligopolists. We analyze how different market structures influence oligopolistic capacity investments and thereby affect supply, prices and...

We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in infinitely repeated games with discounting. Specifically, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in the infinite repetition of...

We investigate the incentives for capacity investments in a simple strategic dynamic model with random demand growth. We construct non-collusive Markovian equilibria where the firms' decisions depend on the current capacity stock only. The firms maintain small reserve margins and high market...