In a dynamic model of assignment problems, small deviations suffice to move between stable outcomes. This result is used to obtain no-selection and almost-no-selection results under the stochastic stability concept for uniform and payoff-dependent errors. There is no-selection of partner or...

We solve the problem of a social planner who seeks to minimize inequality via transfers with a fixed public budget in a distribution of exogenously given incomes. The appropriate solution method depends on the objective function: If it is convex, as in the case of the absolute mean deviation, it...

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated –...

Social optimization problems typically maximize the sum of individual weighted utilities over feasible allocations that satisfy certain constraints. While social optimization problems are at the heart of economic analysis, it is not always clear how to choose individual welfare weights. In this...

In this paper we show how theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker can be used to construct a consensus-halving: a division of an object into two portions so that each of n people believe the portions are equally split. Moreover, the division takes at most n cuts, which is best possible. This extends...

We study divisor methods, the primary class to solve apportionment problems, based upon Stolarsky means S(alphabeta). These encompass the five traditional methods. We disclose a one-to-one relation between methods of the form S(alpha1) and aggregate measures of seat/vote disproportionality of...