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An algorithm for computing the nucleolus of disjunctive additive games with an acyclic permission structure
Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - 2008
cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377258
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Computing the NTU-Shapley value of NTU-games defined by multiple objective linear programs
Andersen, Kim Allan; Lind, Mikael - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 28 (1999) 4, pp. 585-597
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001434013
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Balancedness conditions for exact games
Csóka, Péter; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Kóczy, … - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003647617
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A note on cooperative linear quadratic control
Engwerda, Jacob Christiaan (contributor) - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003483561
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An irrational-behavior-proof condition in cooperative differential games : technical note
Yeung, David W. K. - In: International game theory review 8 (2006) 4, pp. 739-744
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003429221
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Core tâtonnement
Manea, Mihai - In: Journal of economic theory 133 (2007) 1, pp. 331-349
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003445712
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Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria
Babichenko, Yakov - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003949783
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Necessary and sufficient conditions for pareto optimality in infinite horizon cooperative differential games
Reddy, Puduru Viswanadha; Engwerda, Jacob Christiaan - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003987197
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Necessary and sufficient conditions for pareto optimality in infinite horizon cooperative differential games
Reddy, Puduru Viswanadha; Engwerda, Jacob Christiaan - 2011 - rev.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008990972
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Stochastic stability in assignment problems
Klaus, Bettina; Newton, Jonathan - 2014
In a dynamic model of assignment problems, small deviations suffice to move between stable outcomes. This result is used to obtain no-selection and almost-no-selection results under the stochastic stability concept for uniform and payoff-dependent errors. There is no-selection of partner or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010376447