Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterativemethods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed inthe literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both thenumber of its...

We consider a multi-player, cooperative, transferable-utility, symmetric game (N,v) and associated convex covers, i.e., convex games (N,w) such that w is greater than or equal to v. A convex cover w is efficient iff w(0) equals v(0) and w(N) equals v(N); and minimal iff there is no convex cover...

The stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern imposes credibility on coalitional deviations. Their credibility notion can be extended to cover farsighted coalitional deviations, as proposed by Harsanyi (1974), and more recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). However, the resulting...

Individuals often make decisions based on perceived social norms and widely-held stereotypes. It is often difficult to elicit such beliefs, since subjects commonly give inaccurate or “politically correct” responses to subjective, sensitive topics. This paper compares two methodological...

This paper investigates the desirability of adopting a rule in favor of discretionary monetary policy in a model exhibiting Kydland and Prescott's dynamic inconsistency problem. We deviate from earlier work by adopting assumptions regarding policymaker preferences and inflation dynamics that are...

We investigate the desirability of adopting a rule in favor of discretionary monetary policy in a model exhibiting Kydland and Prescott's dynamic inconsistency problem but no fundamental incompatibility between the policymaker's price stability and full employment objectives. We show that if...