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Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees
Ayres, Ian; Rowat, Colin; Zakariya, Nasser - In: Social choice and welfare 36 (2011) 2, pp. 323-354
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839657
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The traveling group problem
Klamler, Christian; Pferschy, Ulrich - In: Social choice and welfare 29 (2007) 3, pp. 429-452
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003534280
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Smallest tournaments not realizable by 2/3-majority voting
Shepardson, Dylan; Tovey, Craig A. - In: Social choice and welfare 33 (2009) 3, pp. 495-503
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003875132
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Condoret vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
Baharad, Eyal; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 71 (2011) 2, pp. 151-162
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248430
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The majority rule with a chairman
Quesada, Antonio - In: Social choice and welfare 40 (2013) 3, pp. 679-691
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009692649
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A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification
Aleskerov, Fuad T.; Karpov, Alexander - In: Social choice and welfare 40 (2013) 3, pp. 771-786
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009693421
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A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz
Brandt, Felix; Chudnovsky, Maria; Kim, Ilhee; Liu, Gaku; … - In: Social choice and welfare 40 (2013) 3, pp. 739-743
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009693424
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Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
Iritani, Jun; Kamo, Tomoyuki; Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi - In: Social choice and welfare 40 (2013) 1, pp. 155-171
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009696134
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Optimal voting rules
Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010241496
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Optimal voting rules
Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen - 2013
We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198499