I investigate three goals of school choice: student welfare, encouraging neighborhood schools, and diversity. I develop a framework for finding the optimal match for any combination of these objectives while respecting stability and incentive compatibility. I then apply my framework to data from...

Many two-sided matching situations involve multiperiod interaction. Traditional cooperative solutions, such as stability and the core, often identify unintuitive outcomes (or are empty) when applied to such markets. As an alternative, this study proposes the criterion of perfect a stability. An...

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated –...

We provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices

This study investigates efficient and strategy‐proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints-ordered accessibility-for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is...

We develop Integer Programming (IP) solutions for some special college admission problems arising from the Hungarian higher education admission scheme. We focus on four special features, namely the solution concept of stable score-limits, the presence of lower and common quotas, and paired...

In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees...

Stable flows generalize the well-known concept of stable matchings to markets in which transactions may involve several agents, forwarding flow from one to another. An instance of the problem consists of a capacitated directed network in which vertices express their preferences over their...

The computational time required to solve and estimate dynamic economic models is one of the main constraints in empirical research. The Endogenous Grid Method (EGM) proposed by Carroll (2006) is known to offer impressive speed gains over more traditional stochastic dynamic programming methods,...