I propose a model where, all else equal, a tyrannical regime is limited by the population density of the area under tyrannical rule. Both when the population density is near zero and when it is very large, the costs of enforcing tyranny approach infinity—thereby tyranny is effectively zero. At...

In this paper we show how theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker can be used to construct a consensus-halving: a division of an object into two portions so that each of n people believe the portions are equally split. Moreover, the division takes at most n cuts, which is best possible. This extends...

A weighted game or a threshold function in general admits different weighted representations even if the sum of non-negative weights is fixed to one. Here we study bounds for the diameter of the corresponding weight polytope. It turns out that the diameter can be upper bounded in terms of the...

This paper presents the conditions required for a profile in order to never exhibit either the strong or the strict Borda paradoxes under all weighted scoring rules in three-candidate elections. The main particularity of our paper is that all the conclusions are extracted from the differences of...

We study the problem of determining memberships to the groups in a Boolean algebra. The Boolean algebra is composed of basic groups (e.g., “J” and “K”) and the other groups that are derived from basic groups through the conjunction, disjunction, or negation operations (e.g., “J and...

We study divisor methods, the primary class to solve apportionment problems, based upon Stolarsky means S(alphabeta). These encompass the five traditional methods. We disclose a one-to-one relation between methods of the form S(alpha1) and aggregate measures of seat/vote disproportionality of...