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We analyze optimal compensation schedules for the directors of two plants belonging to the same owner and producing the same good but serving geographically differentiated markets. Since the outcome of each director depends on his own effort and on a random variable representing market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318699
We provide a technique for constructing optimal multiattribute screening contracts in a general setting with one-dimensional types based on necessary optimality conditions. Our approach allows for type-dependent participation constraints and arbitrary risk profiles. As an example we discuss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978605
Recent empirical studies conclude that small firms have higher but more variable growth rates than large firms. To explore the effect of this size-dependence regularity on moral hazard and investment, we develop a continuous-time agency model with time-varying firm size. Firm size is a diffusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905816
—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive formulations allow us to reduce often complex models to a sequence of essentially … of the basic theory: the Revelation Principle, formulating and simplifying the incentive constraints, using promised … advanced topics: duality theory and Lagrange multiplier techniques, models with lack of commitment, and martingale methods in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024287
This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697514
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009750651
We analyze optimal compensation schedules for the directors of two plants belonging to the same owner and producing the same good but serving geographically differentiated markets. Since the outcome of each director depends on his own effort and on a random variable representing market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261151
I/B/E/S removes 6% of one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts from the calculation of the consensus forecast. This study examines managers' role in these removals. We show optimistic forecasts are removed more often than pessimistic forecasts, after controlling for removal policies that I/B/E/S...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898780
We consider a “tenure-clock problem” in which a principal may set a deadline by which she needs to evaluate an agent's ability and decides whether to promote him or not. We embed this problem in a continuous-time model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030521
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979703