Expected consumer's surplus rarely represents preferences over price lotteries. Still, I give sufficient conditions for policies which maximize aggregate expected surplus to be interim Pareto Optimal. Besides two standard partial equilibrium conditions, I assume that feasible prices satisfy a...

We investigate two alternative explanations why men may hold more stocks than women. Apart from a gender difference in risk aversion, gender differences in either optimism or in perceived risk of financial markets might cause men to hold more risky assets. Our results show that men tend to be...

We propose robust optimization models and their tractable approximations that cater for ambiguity-averse decision makers whose underlying risk preferences are consistent with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Specifically, we focus on maximizing the worst-case expected exponential utility...

Outcomes of the shallow lake interest conflict are presented in a number of different contexts: quasi-static and dynamic social planning, and quasi-static one-shot and repeated non-cooperative play. As the underlying dynamics are non-convex, the analysis uses geometrical-numerical methods: the...

In this article we address the problem of finding feedback Nash equilibria for linear quadratic differential games defined on descriptor systems. First, we decouple the dynamic and algebraic parts of a descriptor system using canonical projectors. We discuss the effects of feedback on the...

In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for an infinite planning horizon. We consider an open-loop information structure. In the standard literature this problem is solved under the assumption that every player can stabilize the system on his own. In...

In this note we present both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a linear static state feedback controller if the system is described by an index one descriptor system. A priori no definiteness restrictions are made w.r.t. the quadratic performance criterium. It is shown...