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Optimal mechanisms for single machine scheduling

Heydenreich, Birgit; Mishra, Debasis; Müller, Rudolf; … - In: Internet and network economics : 4th international …, (pp. 414-425). 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003792618

Optimal mechanisms for single machine scheduling

Heydenreich, Birgit; Mishra, Debasis; Müller, Rudolf; … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003811400

Path-monotonicity and incentive compatibility

Berger, André; Müller, Rudolf; Naeemi, Seyed Hossein - 2010

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Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good

Csapó, Gergely; Müller, Rudolf - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009572971

Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good

Csapó, Gergely; Müller, Rudolf - In: Games and economic behavior 80 (2013), pp. 229-242

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009763906

Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multidimensional environments

Berger, André; Müller, Rudolf; Naeemi, Seyed Hossein - 2014

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Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games

Lee, Jiwoong; Müller, Rudolf; Vermeulen, Dries - 2014

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On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem

Duives, Jelle; Heydenreich, Birgit; Mishra, Debasis; … - In: Journal of scheduling 18 (2015) 1, pp. 45-59

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481999

Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments

Berger, André; Müller, Rudolf; Naeemi, Seyed Hossein - In: Social choice and welfare 48 (2017) 2, pp. 367-383

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011885475

Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good

Csapó, Gergely; Müller, Rudolf - In: Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013) C, pp. 229-242

We study the problem of finding the profit-maximizing mechanism for a monopolistic provider of a single, non-excludable public good. Our model covers the most general setting, namely, we allow for correlation in the signal distribution as well as for informational externalities in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049766