A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable …

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and … performance of our mechanism. Finally, we discuss how the mechanism can be applied to award R&D subsidies. …

discuss the problem in a detail free setting. -- Mechanism Design ; Subsidies ; Budget ; Procurement ; Knapsack Problem …A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable …

This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants … procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex …-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify …

This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and … performance of our mechanism. Finally, we discuss how the mechanism can be applied to award R&D subsidies. -- Auctions ; subsidies …