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A small volume reduction that melts down the market : auctions with endogenous rationing
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Hanke, Ann-Katrin; Ott, Marion - 2020
Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition. Such (procurement) auctions reduce the volume put out to tender when competition is low. This paper finds a strong negative effect of endogenous rationing on participation when bid-preparation is costly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195628
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Electricity markets : designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Holmberg, Pär; Wolak, Frank A. - 2015
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410462
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2016 - Revised version
externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our … experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011471404
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A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : an experiment for the Vickrey auction
Masuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyataka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; … - 2019
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to … the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024698
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2015 - Revised version, November 2015
-price auction. Our experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average … bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389576
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Auction design for a strategic reserve market for generation adequacy : on the incentives under different auction scoring rules
Brunekreeft, Gert; Meyer, Roland; Rammerstorfer, Margarethe - 2013
How should we select winning bids of generation units for strategic reserves that consist of capacity bids and energy bids? In this paper, we analyze two selecting mechanisms (scoring rules): "simultaneous" and "sequential". In case of a simultaneous scoring rule, capacity and energy bids are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423667
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Tell the truth or not? : the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2019
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112503
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Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent - 2017
settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697176
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Tell the truth or not? : the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2018
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787201