Showing 1 - 10 of 564
We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711
The marginal cost of effort often increases as effort is exerted. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, dynamically increasing costs create information asymmetry. This paper characterizes the optimal contract and helps explain the popular yet thus far puzzling use of non-linear incentives, for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009699416
We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042983
We study a mechanism design problem under the assumption that renegotiation cannot be prevented. We investigate what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are renegotiation-proof under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions can be implemented in a way that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583353
Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011297547
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants’ choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460341
This paper describes a mechanism designed to induce commercial banks to increase their willingness to extend loans in an economic environment characterized by increased uncertainty and diminished expectations. This mechanism is a new tool for the conduct of monetary policy to combat recessions.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277544
We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. In particular, we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if, having observed the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263577
In a class of informed principal problems with common values, we define iteratively a particular allocation which we call the assured allocation. It is comparatively easy to calculate and straightforward to interpret. It always exists, is unique and continuous in the priors. It is undominated,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263581