mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i ….e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice … interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementability in unique …

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are … dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in … this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions …

The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such that the equilibrium outcomes …-implemented. Even non-monotonic social choice rules can be implemented using Nash equilibrium refinements. The implementation problem … can be made more challenging by imposing additional requirements on the mechanisms, such as robustness to renegotiation …