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Procurement with unforeseen contingencies

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017 - This version: October 15, 2017

The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762526

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the optimality of cutoff mechanisms

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063

Chapter 9. Algorithmic Mechanism Design : Through the lens of Multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 477-515). 2015

addressing it by focusing on a single simple problem: multiunit auctions. A variety of issues will be discussed: representation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450

Matching through position auctions

Johnson, T.R. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 4, pp. 1700-1713

conditions, all-pay position auctions always implement the profit-maximizing allocation. Winners-pay position auctions, however …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678862

Spectrum Auction Design

Cramton, Peter - 2012

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. The standard …. I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the approach with examples from US spectrum auctions. I then present a …. Experimental tests and early auctions confirm the advantages of the approach …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041583

Second best efficiency and the English auction

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 496-506

We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049683

Extortion and political-risk insurance

Koessler, Frédéric; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane - In: Journal of Public Economics 120 (2014) C, pp. 144-156

We consider the problem faced by firms operating in a foreign country characterized by weak governance. Our focus is on extortion based on the threat of expropriation and bureaucratic harassment. The bureaucrat's bargaining power is characterized by a general extortion mechanism adapted from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117643

On the optimality of not allocating

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Economics Letters 125 (2014) 2, pp. 233-235

We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076536

Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis

Chen, Ning; Ghosh, Arpita; Lambert, Nicolas S. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 367-391

Prosper, today the second largest social lending marketplace with nearly 1.5 million members and $380 million in funded loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785191

Colluding on Participation Decisions

Pavlov, Gregory - Department of Economics, Boston University - 2006

We study the principal’s optimal response to collusion in an adverse selection environment. Building on the framework of Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) we advance it into several directions. First, unlike most of the literature, we study a stronger collusion when the agents can coordinate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004972914