Showing 1 - 10 of 250
We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064897
Can mechanism design save democracy? We propose a simple design that offers a chance: individuals pay for as many votes as they wish using a number of "voice credits" quadratic in the votes they buy. Only quadratic cost induces marginal costs linear in votes purchased and thus welfare optimality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975457
This online appendix proves the central result in Lalley and Weyl (Forthcoming). The full text PDF for "Qaudratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy" may be found here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126996
This study considers a school choice problem with general feasibility constraints. Each student belongs to a grade; and two students belonging to the same grade are symmetric, whereas those belonging to different grades can be asymmetric with respect to the feasibility constraint of a school. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014114011
This study observes that no group strategy-proof mechanism satisfies even a fairly weak notion of stability in a school choice setting. In response to this result, we introduce two monotonicity axioms, which we call top-dropping monotonicity and extension monotonicity, as alternatives to group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082744
Even though kidney exchange became an important source of kidney transplants over the last decade with the introduction of market design techniques to organ transplantation, the shortage of kidneys for transplantation is greater than ever. Due to biological disadvantages, patient populations of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999371
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220157
We consider a controlled school choice model where students are divided into several types such as socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged. The priority for a school is dependent on the type distribution of the assignment. Our model is a generalization of several models in previous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013239023
I provide a brief introduction to the early literatures on Matching, Auctions, and Market Design.The design of matching markets and auctions has brought economic theory and practice together. Indeed, this is an area where microeconomic theory has had its largest direct impact. This is in part...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082184
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087203