Merging firms regularly argue that mergers involving capacity-constrained firms are unlikely to be anti-competitive, because the incentive for the merged firm to raise prices and reduce quantity may not be strong enough to generate slack in the capacity constraints and lead to higher prices. We...

This paper contributes to a sparse literature on merger remedies amid renewed interest in assessing remedy effectiveness by global antitrust policy agencies. Despite frequent use in practice, merger remedies receive little attention in the economics literature. We address this deficiency by...

Merging firms regularly argue that mergers involving capacity-constrained firms are unlikelyto be anticompetitive, because a capacity-constrained firm does not represent a meaningful competitive constraint on its rivals. We construct a modified notion of upward pricing pressure called ccGUPPI,...

Mergers of horizontal competitors may affect product quality as well as price. For example,potential quality effects are often considered when analyzing healthcare mergers. There exists asmall theoretical literature on the effects of mergers on quality when price and quality are chosenby a...

Suppose differentiated firms compete in quantities. This paper derives a formula for the minimum cost savings that would offset the incentive to increase price created by a merger. The formula depends only on pre-merger information on margins and demand slopes, and is invariant to demand and...