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Chapter 15 Antitrust
Kaplow, Louis; Shapiro, Carl - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 2, (pp. 1073-1225). 2007
This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023495
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Horizontal merger analysis
Kaplow, Louis - 2020
Economic analysis of competition regulation is most developed in the domain of horizontal mergers, and modern agency guidelines reflect a substantial consensus on the appropriate template for merger assessment. Nevertheless, official protocols are understood to rest on a problematic market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012428221
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Chapter 36 Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers
Whinston, Michael D. - In: Handbook of industrial organization : volume 3, (pp. 2369-2440). 2007
Recently there has been a notable increase in interest in antitrust law in much of the world. This chapter discusses antitrust policy toward horizontal mergers, the area of antitrust that has seen some of the most dramatic improvements in both economic tools and the application of economics in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024580
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Partial cartels and mergers with heterogenous firms : experimental evidence
Gomez-Martinez, Francisco - 2017
A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels are all-inclusive. In contrast, most real-world collusive … experimentally the formation and behavior of partial cartels. The theoretical model is a variation of Bos and Harrington's (2010 … experimental study has two main objectives. The first goal is examine whether partial cartels emerge in the lab at all, and if so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761059
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Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages: The role of internal organization, information, and market structure
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2001
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, me rger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare – improving even if costs are linear. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307515
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The effect of horizontal mergers on efficiency and market power: An application to the Argentine hamburger market
Coloma, Germán - 2019
This paper analyzes the behavior of the Argentine hamburger market during the period 2013-2018, to see if an important merger that occurred by the end of 2015 (the BRF/MRP merger) had any discernable market-power or efficiency effects. To do this, we run an econometric demand-and-supply model,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012609509
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An Empirical Analysis of Competition in Print Adversiting among Paid and Free Newspapers
Brooke, Geoffrey; Cheung, Lydia - 2018
This paper examines the competition in the print newspaper advertising market in New Zealand, which involves paid daily and free weekly titles. This is the first study to explore how different ownership structures across two newspaper segments affect the competitive forces in local geographic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012624285
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Horizontal mergers, involuntary unemployment, and welfare
Budzinski, Oliver; Budzinski, Jürgen-Peter - 2009
Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003836388
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Implications of unprofitable horizontal mergers : a positive external effect does not suffice to clear a merger!
Budzinski, Oliver; Kretschmer, Jürgen-Peter - 2009
We demonstrate that the popular Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) for the analysis of mergers in oligopolies relies regarding its policy conclusions sensitively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately profitable mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003821593
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Horizontal mergers, involuntary unemployment, and welfare
Budzinski, Oliver; Kretschmer, Jürgen-Peter - 2009
Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003849829