We investigate the incentive for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when the retailers are privately informed about their production costs and engage in differentiated good price competition. Partial vertical integration...

We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (manufacturers)that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties....

There have been a number of studies attempting to quantify the impact of cartels and mergers on prices. The state of the art of empirical analysis related to antitrust is best illustrated by the research of John Connor and John Kwoka. Connor summarizes the existing empirical research that...

The U.S. residential real estate agency market presents a puzzle for economic theory: commissions on real estate transactions have remained high for decades even though entry is frequent and costs are low. We model the real estate agency market, and other brokered markets, as a game in which...

In this journal, James Langenfeld critically reviewed four of the present authors' articles that analyze the size of cartel overcharges and their antitrust policy implications. In this comment, we explain why we believe Langenfeld errs in his criticism of our work. In particular, this comment...

One of the most enduring controversies in antitrust concerns the potential foreclosure effects of vertical integration. In a recent paper, Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) construct a model of vertical integration in which vertical foreclosure emerges as the equilibrium outcome. However, as is...