This paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a...

The first part of this paper analyzes the impact of horizontal mergers of suppliers or retailers on their respective bargaining power. In contrast to previous approaches, we suppose that parties resolve the bargaining problem efficiently. Moreover, by ensuring that demand is independent at all...

This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the implication of market structure for the distribution of...

We challenge the view that the presence of powerful buyers stifles suppliers´ incentives to innovate. Following Katz (1987), we model buyer power as buyers´ ability to substitute away from a given supplier and isolate several effects that support the opposite view, namely that the presence of...

We challenge the view that the presence of powerful buyers stifles suppliers ́incentives to innovate. Following Katz (1987), we model buyer power as buyers ́ability to substitute away from a given supplier and isolate several effects that support the opposite view, namely that the presence of...