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Settle for now but block for tomorrow: the deterrence effects of merger policy tools

Seldeslachts, Jo; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Barros, Pedro Pita - In: The journal of law & economics 52 (2009) 3, pp. 607-634

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003930338

Remedy for now but prohibit for tomorrow : the deterrence effects of merger policy tools

Seldeslachts, Jo; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Barros, Pedro Pita - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003686213

Remedy for now but prohibit for tomorrow : the deterrence effects of merger policy tools

Seldeslachts, Jo; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Barros, Pedro Pita - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003547994

How to measure the deterrence effects of merger policy : frequency or composition?

Barros, Pedro Pita; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Seldeslachts, Jo - In: International journal of the economics of business 17 (2010) 1, pp. 1-8

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003960712

The deterrence effects of US merger policy instruments

Clougherty, Joseph A.; Seldeslachts, Jo - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261160

Effective European antitrust : does EC merger policy generate deterrence?

Clougherty, Joseph A.; Duso, Tomaso; Lee, Miyu; … - 2015

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as – unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions – phase-1 remedies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392122