Many informal firms in developing countries would not be viable if they were to comply with the minimum wage law. This means the authorities have an incentive to turn a blind eye to nonenforcement in a substantial share of firms. We also survey enforcement mechanisms for the minimum wage across...

We model a standard competitve labour market where firms choose combinations of workers and hours per worker to produce output. If one assumes that the scale of production has no impact on hours per worker, then the change in the number of workers and hours per worker resulting from a minimum...

In a competitive model we ease the assumption that efficiency units of labour are the product of hours and workers. We show that a minimum wage may either increase or decrease hours per worker and the change will have the opposite sign to the slope of the equilibrium hours hourly wage locus....

In monopsony models of the labour market either a minimum wage or an employment subsidy financed by a lump sum tax on profits can achieve the efficient level of employment and output. Incorporating working conditions into a monopsony model where higher wages raise firm labour supply, but less...

On April the 6th of 1998 the government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago introduced a National Minimum Wage for the first time. Using the Trinidad and Tobago labour force survey we show that potential costs, if there had been full compliance, could have been substantial. An examination of...