The minority game is a generic model of competing adaptive agents, which is often believed to be a model of financial markets. We discuss to which extent this is a reasonable statement, and present minimal modifications that make this model reproduce stylized facts. The resulting model shows...

Minority games where groups of agents remember, react or incorporate information with different timescales are investigated. We support our findings by analytical arguments whenever possible.

We investigate further several properties of the minority game we have recently introduced. We explain the origin of the phase transition and give an analytical expression of σ2/N in the N⪡2M region. The ability of the players to learn a given payoff is also analyzed, and we show that the...

Starting from the Minority Game and building more and more sophisticated models of adaptive agents, we show that minority mechanisms underly any model where agents learn collectively a resource level that can be either obvious and constant in time, obvious and time-varying, or hidden.

We study the behavior of simple models for financial markets with widely spread frequency either in the trading activity of agents or in the occurrence of basic events. The generic picture of a phase transition between information efficient and inefficient markets still persists even when agents...

The $-Game was recently introduced as an extension of the Minority Game. In this paper we compare this model with the well know Minority Game and the Majority Game models. Due to the inter-temporal nature of the market payoff, we introduce a two step transaction with single and mixed group of...